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Abstract. Fiscal harmonization for the European Union member states is a
goal that encounters major di¢ culties for its implementation. Each country
faces a particular trade-o⁄ between ￿scal revenues generated by taxation and
the productive e¢ ciency loss induced by their respective tax code. Countries
for which a particular harmonized tax code requires more taxation, will have
to face an increased e¢ ciency loss, for those required to decrease their taxes,
will have to face a loss in ￿scal revenue. This papers provides a quantitative
measure of these trade-o⁄s, for a number of taxes and for the European Union
member states, using a DGE model with public inputs. Calibration of the model
for the EU-15 member states gives us the following results: i) The maximum
tax revenue level is not far away from the current tax levels for most countries,
ii) The cases of Sweden, Denmark and Finland are anomalous, as productive
e¢ ciency can be gained by lowering tax rates without a⁄ecting ￿scal revenues,
iii) In general, countries would obtain e¢ ciency gains without changing ￿scal
revenues by reducing the capital tax and increasing the labor tax and iv) Capital
tax harmonization to the average capital tax rate can be done with quite small
changes in both ￿scal revenues and output for the majority of countries.
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11 Introduction
Fiscal harmonization for the European Union member states is a goal that en-
counters major di¢ culties for its implementation. Each country faces a partic-
ular trade-o⁄ between ￿scal revenues generated by taxation and the productive
e¢ ciency loss induced by the tax code. Countries for which a particular harmo-
nized tax code requires more taxation, will have to face an increased productive
e¢ ciency loss, for those required to decrease their taxes, will have to face a loss
in ￿scal revenues. However, if we consider a menu of taxes, we can ￿nd some
space for ￿scal harmonization changing the composition of the tax code. By,
say, increasing labor income tax in some proportion, and reducing capital tax
in some other proportion, we could keep constant ￿scal revenues while increas-
ing productive e¢ ciency. This paper provides a quantitative measure of these
trade-o⁄s for a number of taxes and for the European Union member states
(EU-15).1
Fiscal harmonization is a very important question in the context of the
European Union, particularly with respect to capital income taxes for which
there exist important di⁄erences across EU countries. Di⁄erences in capital
taxes will lead to competition to attract capital from abroad (the so-called
race to the bottom), given the high capital mobility around the world. This is
particularly important in the context of the European Union where there is free
capital mobility and it was the European Commission who stressed the need
to remove the corporate tax obstacles in order to promote the creation of an
integrated single market for doing business in Europe. Tanzi and Bovenberg
(1990) pointed out the need to harmonize capital taxes within the EU, given
the existence of an uni￿ed market with free capital movements. However, it is
not clear the way how harmonization should be done. First, the particular tax
system implemented by each country re￿ ects di⁄erent objectives with di⁄erent
government expenditure patterns. On the other hand, there are no clear reasons
to think that a particular tax system is preferable to another, and rises the
question about the system around which to harmonize the di⁄erent tax systems.
As pointed out by Tanzi and Bovenberg (1990), without harmonization of
capital income taxes, the allocation of capital across countries would be ine¢ -
cient due to the fact that the capital returns would tend to be equalized after
and not before taxes as well as the existence of externalities on other countries.
Słrensen (2004) use a static general equilibrium model to analyze corporate tax
1We consider all the countries of the EU-15 except Luxemburg.
2harmonization in the European Union, where harmonization is assumed to take
place at the unweighted average corporate tax rate. He obtain that the ag-
gregate static e¢ ciency gain from corporate tax harmonization would be quite
small.
In this paper we study the scope for ￿scal harmonization in the EU coun-
tries. For it, we consider a highly aggregated dynamic general equilibrium model
similar to that of Conesa and Kehoe (2003) and FernÆndez de C￿rdoba and Tor-
regrosa (2005), to study the e⁄ects of di⁄erent tax codes for each of the countries
in the EU-15. The main di⁄erence between our model and those of the litera-
ture is that we introduce in the production function a public input, where the
stock of public capital is ￿nanced with ￿scal revenues. Following Feehan and
Matsumoto (2002) we consider factor-augmenting public inputs, that is, such
inputs are considered as intermediate goods that a⁄ect the production function
and give rise to increasing returns. In the absence of a public input in the pro-
duction function, the tax code trivially associated to full e¢ ciency is zero for all
taxes. Since we want to study the trade o⁄ between productive e¢ ciency and
￿scal revenues for a collection of countries with di⁄erent public capital stocks,
the introduction of a public input induces the need of some country-speci￿c tax
exaction in order to have production. In this line, the paper develops a DGE
model calibrated to data from the EU economies to obtain e⁄ective average tax
rates, preference and technology parameters to solve a set of question regarding
the ￿scal policy in the EU countries.
In a very related work, Trabandt and Uhlig (2006) conduct a similar analysis.
They compute bi-dimmensional iso-revenue curves for the US and the EU-15.
To ￿nd the proportion in which each of the EU-15 countries should reduce
or increase taxes, is the quantitative question this paper aims to answer. For
it, we have modelled the productive sector producing a single output out of
three productive factors, namely, private capital stock, labor, and the stock of a
public input provided by the government. This speci￿cation of the aggregated
production function allows us to model a public sector that operates in two
dimensions: redistributing income, and providing public capital stocks, trough
public investments, for the production process. The aggregated production
function will provide us with a measure of the e¢ ciency gains associated to
di⁄erent compositions for the income tax code.
We compute the combinations of capital and labor tax rates (taking the
consumption tax rate as given) that maximize ￿scal revenues, i.e., we build a
bi-dimensional La⁄er curve and compute its maximum in terms of these two-
3dimensional ￿scal instruments to compare the current ￿scal revenue situation
in each country. Two important facts arise from this comparison: First, the
maximum ￿scal revenue for each country is associated to relatively low values
of the tax rates, and for most of the countries these values are very close to
the observed ones. Second, the La⁄er curve is very ￿ at around the maximum.
These two facts put together imply that the EU-15 countries studied here are
not very far from the maximal ￿scal revenue. Third, the rate of substitution
between capital and labor taxes keeping ￿scal revenues constant is very large,
i.e., a large decrease in capital tax can be compensated with a small increase
in the labor tax to keep a constant revenue. This is a natural result due to the
relative participations in ￿scal revenues. Since the rate of substitution between
capital and labor taxes that keeps production constant is in general low, some
space is open to modify the tax code so that revenues are kept constant while
increasing productive e¢ ciency. Fourth, given the observed consumption tax,
the maximum productive e¢ ciency level is not far from a zero income tax code
level for most countries. This implies that to maintain public capital stocks,
￿scal revenues obtained via the consumption tax are enough. Our approach
is to ￿nd the income tax code that for each country minimizes productive ef-
￿ciency losses given the observed ￿scal revenue. We derive a bi-dimensional
iso-output function indicating the combination of capital and labor taxes that
corresponds to a certain level of aggregated output. Assuming the same level
of ￿scal revenues, we compute the combination of capital and labor taxes for
which output is maximized. In general, the optimal taxation policy implies
the reduction of the capital tax rate together with an increase in the labor tax
rate. We obtain that the current income tax code for Austria is optimal. Other
countries, as Belgium, Denmark, Finland and France, obtain little gains from
changing the current combination of taxes to the optimal one. However, for
the rest of countries there exist potential gains in e¢ ciency by increasing labor
taxes and reducing capital taxes. Also, there is a set of countries (Germany,
Ireland, Portugal, Spain and the UK), for which the optimal capital tax is zero.
Being more speci￿c with respect to the ￿rst ￿nding, although most of the
EU-15 countries are very close to the maximum revenue tax code (the maximum
of the La⁄er curve), as it is the case of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland and
Sweden, some countries are a bit further, as it is the case of Ireland, Portugal,
Spain and the UK.
These four features of the La⁄er curve calculated for the EU-15 countries,
suggest that a reduction in capital taxation may be the proper direction to take
4in an agreeable ￿scal harmonization. Two possibilities are considered: i) follow-
ing Słrensen (2004), harmonization is assumed to take place at the unweighted
average capital tax rate (0.26), and ii) harmonization is assumed to take place
at the minimum capital tax rate, which corresponds to Ireland (0.14). When
capital tax harmonization is assumed to take place at the average rate, ￿scal
revenues su⁄er only small changes in most of the countries. However, output
shows signi￿cant changes. When harmonization is assumed to take place at the
Irish capital rate, ￿scal revenues are signi￿cantly reduced for most countries but
with large increases in output. Alternatively, our approach of ￿nding the opti-
mal tax code for each country (pairs of capital and labor tax that keep revenues
at the observed level with increases in productive e¢ ciency) could result in a
￿ convergence￿of the tax codes. If this is the case we would have ￿nd the natural
way to harmonize to some extent the European tax system. The measures we
obtain from this simulated European tax system give us an idea of the limits to
a ￿scal harmonization where gains are expected for all countries.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we describe the model.
Section 3 presents the data we use and the calibration procedure. Section 4
shows the ￿gures of the bi-dimensional La⁄er curves. Section 5 studies the
optimal tax code for each country. The e⁄ects of capital tax harmonization are
collected in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 presents some conclusions.
2 The public inputs model
We consider a production function that relates output with three inputs: labor,
private capital and public capital stocks. Our choice of the production function
assumes that a positive level of public capital is necessary for production, which
implies that for the output to be positive, there must be a minimum level of
￿scal revenues. The government taxes private consumption goods, capital in-
come and labor income to ￿nance an exogenous sequence of lump-sum transfers,
fTtg
1
t=0, and a sequence of public investment, fIgtg
1
t=0, which induces a public




Consider a model economy where the decisions made by consumers are repre-
sented by a stand-in consumer, who￿ s preferences are represented by the follow-
5ing instantaneous utility function:
U(Ct;NtH ￿ Lt) = ￿ logCt + (1 ￿ ￿)log(NtH ￿ Lt); (1)
Private consumption is denoted by Ct: Leisure is NtH ￿Lt; and is calculated as
the number of e⁄ective hours in the week times the number of weeks in a year
H; times population in the age of taking labor-leisure decisions, Nt; minus the
aggregated number of hours worked in a year Lt: The parameter ￿ (0 < ￿ < 1)
is the proportion of private consumption on total private income. The budget
constraint faced by the stand-in consumer is:
(1 + ￿c
t)Ct + Kt ￿ Kt￿1 = (1 ￿ ￿l
t)We
t Lt + (1 ￿ ￿k
t)(Re
t ￿ ￿)Kt￿1 + Tt; (2)
where Tt is the transfer received by consumers from the government, Kt is the
private capital stock, We
t is the compensation to employees, Re
t is the rental




t, are the private consumption tax, the labor income tax and the capital
income tax respectively2. The budget constraints says that consumption and
investment cannot exceed the sum of labor and capital rental income net of
taxes and lump sum transfers.
The problem faced by the stand-in consumer is to maximize the value of her
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t and K0 and where ￿ 2 (0;1), is the consumer￿ s discount factor.
2.2 Firms
The problem of the ￿rm is to ￿nd optimal values for the utilization of labor and
capital given the presence of public inputs. The stand-in ￿rm is represented
2Tax rates are constants, and can be interpreted as average marginal tax rates. Jonsson
and Klein (1996) use a isoelastic speci￿cation of the tax schedule rather than a linear one in
order to capture the progressivity of income taxation.
6by a nested C.E.S. with a standard Cobb-Douglas production function3. The
production of ￿nal output, Y , requires labor services, L, and two types of cap-
ital: private capital, K, and public capital (public infrastructures), G. Goods
and factors markets are assumed to be perfectly competitive. The ￿rm rents
capital and hire labor in order to maximize period pro￿ts, taking public inputs
and factor prices as given. The technology exhibits constant return to private
factors and thus, the pro￿ts are zero in equilibrium. However, the ￿rms earn
an economic pro￿t equal to the di⁄erence between the value of output and the
payments made to the private inputs. We assume that these pro￿ts are distrib-
uted between the private inputs in an amount proportional to the private input













where At is a measure of total-factor productivity, ￿ is the private capital share
of output, ￿ measures the weight on public capital relative to private factors
and 1=(1￿￿) is a measure of the elasticity of substitution between public inputs
and private inputs.5
2.3 Government
Finally, we consider the two-side role of the government: as a tax-levying and as
supplier of public inputs. The government uses tax revenues to ￿nance spending
in public investment (infrastructures) which rises total factor productivity and
lump-sum transfers paid out to the consumers. We assume that the government
balances its budget period-by-period by returning revenues from distortionary
taxes to the agents via lump-sum transfers, Tt.
The government obtain resources from the economy by taxing consumption








t Lt + ￿k
t(Re
t ￿ ￿)Kt￿1 = Tt + Igt + gt: (4)
3Cassou and Lansing (1998) introduce public capital stock using a Cobb-Douglas produc-
tion function. In the calibration they consider a range of values for the public capital share of
output between 0 and 0.2. Aschauer (1989) and Munnell (1990) estimate values of 0.39 and
0.34, respectively. On the other hand, Aaron (1990) and Tatom (1991) estimate values that
are not statistically di⁄erent from zero.
4Guo and Lansing (1997) using a similar technology, assume that each household owns a
single ￿rm and that all households receive equal ammounts of total pro￿ts.
5FernÆndez de C￿rdoba and Torregrosa (2005) conducted a similar execise but without the
inclusiong of public inputs in the production function.
7Public investments, Igt; induce public consumption of goods and services, gt;
which do not contribute to either production or household utility, and these
two sources of expenditure plus the transfers to consumers, are the counterpart
of ￿scal income. We assume that the government views gt as exogenous. The
government keeps a ￿scal balance in each period. This assumption is done to
highlight the distortionary e⁄ects of taxes, mainly on capital accumulation6.
Public investments accrue into the public structures stock. We will assume
that the rate of depreciation of public stocks is identical to private capital, and
therefore we write:
Gt = (1 ￿ ￿)Gt￿1 + Igt
which is analogous to the private capital accumulation process. Public invest-
ments, such as railroads, airports, roads, law enforcements, etc., induce a yearly
￿ ow of nonproductive expenditures, and that we will consider proportional to
the public capital stock. Therefore gt = ￿Gt; where ￿ ￿ 0:
2.4 Equilibrium
Our model has three productive factors. However, the third factor, the public
capital, has no market price. This implies that the rent generated by the public
input must be assigned to the private factors. From the ￿rm pro￿t maximization
problem, the ￿rst order conditions are:


































Where Xt = ￿G
￿







: Notice that equation (7) is not
properly a condition of the model since there is no agent to claim the income
generated by the public input. From the above equations we can obtain the
following relations that will be useful for our calibration:



























6This assumption have been used by Barro (1990), Glomm and Ravikumar (1994), Cassou
and Lansing (1998), among others. They argue that this setup may represent a closer approx-
imation to actual constraints than one which allows the government to borrow or lend large
amounts.
8From private factor income ratios we obtain that RtKt=WtLt = ￿=(1￿￿): The


















































= (1 ￿ ￿)e Y
￿
t :
The l.h.s. ratio can be obtained from national accounts, whereas the r.h.s. is
a transformation of the usual estimation of the output from an assumed aggre-
gated Cobb-Douglas production function. The ￿rm will produce extraordinary





t￿1; since this amount is not
inputted to the owner of the factor. The government usually does not charge
a price that covers the full cost of the services provided with the contribution
of public inputs. Therefore a rent is generated. We assume that this rent is
dissipated and absorbed by the other factors as:
Re





























The e⁄ective return to capital Re
t; includes a share s of the payment to the public
input, and the e⁄ective return to labor We
t ; absorbs the balancing (1 ￿ s): If






























= (1 ￿ ￿)Yt:
Therefore, the economy satis￿es the following feasibility constraint:
Ct + It + Igt + gt = Re
tKt￿1 + We
t Lt (9)































































2.5 Solution of the model
To compute the solution of the model, we assign the Lagrange multiplier ￿t; to




￿ ￿t(1 + ￿c




+ ￿t(1 ￿ ￿l
t)We










t￿1 = 0: (12)
Together with the ￿rst order conditions of the ￿rm (5); and (6), the budget con-
straint of the government (4), and the feasibility constraint of the economy,(9),
characterize a competitive equilibrium for the economy.
De￿nition. A competitive equilibrium for this economy is a sequence of
consumption, leisure, and private investment fCt;NtH ￿Lt;Itg1
t=0 for the con-
sumers, a sequence of capital and labor utilization for the ￿rm fKt;Ltg1
t=0,
and a sequence of government transfers fTtg1








t=0 and a sequence of public investments
fIgtg1
t=0:
i) The optimization problem of the consumer is satis￿ed.
ii) Given prices for capital and labor, and given a sequence for public inputs,
the ￿rst order conditions of the ￿rm, with respect to capital and labor are
satis￿ed.
iii) Given a sequence of taxes, and government investment, the sequence
of transfers and current spending are such that the government constraint is
satis￿ed. And ￿nally,
iv) The feasibility constraint of the economy is satis￿ed.
Notice that according to the de￿nition of equilibrium for our model econ-
omy, the government enters completely parameterized, and ￿scal policy is made
consistent to the model and the data. In other words, in our model the pri-
vate sector reacts optimally to policy changes, and this policy changes are given
exogenously.
103 Data and Calibration
Before simulating the model, values must be assigned to the parameters. The
parameters of the model are:
(￿;￿;￿;￿;￿;￿;￿c;￿l;￿k)
In calibrating the model presented in the previous section we need three
di⁄erent sets of information: Taxes rates (￿c;￿l;￿k), technological parameters,
(￿;￿;￿;￿) and preference parameters, (￿;￿;). Following Kydland and Prescott
(1982) we set in advance as many parameters as possible based upon a priory
information.
3.1 Tax rates
Computational macroeconomic models of ￿scal policy depend crucially on re-
alistic measures of tax rates. Agents decisions depend on marginal tax and
therefore, e⁄ective marginal taxes should be used in the calibration. However,
the estimation of marginal tax rates is a di¢ cult task and, as pointed out by
Mendoza, Razin and Tesar (1994), at an international level is often an impracti-
cal task given limitations imposed by data availability and di¢ culties in dealing
with the complexity of tax systems. Mendoza et al. (1994) proposed a method
to estimate e⁄ective average taxes and show that their estimated average tax
rates are within the range of marginal tax rates estimated in previous works
and display very similar trends. On the other hand, Mendoza et al. (1994)
argue that their de￿nition of e⁄ective average tax rates can be interpreted as an
estimation of speci￿c tax rates that a representative agent, in a general equilib-
rium context, takes into account. Słrensen (2004) also use empirical estimates
of average e⁄ective tax rates in calibrating a static GE model.
In this paper we use e⁄ective average tax rates, that we borrow from BoscÆ
et al. (2005), who use the methodology proposed by Mendoza et al. (1994) to
estimate e⁄ective average tax rates7. Table 1 shows the estimated average tax
rates of BoscÆ et al. (2005) for the year 2001 for the selected countries, including
consumption tax rates, labor tax rates and capital tax rates. However, the use of
7Calonge and Conesa (2003) estimated marginal tax rates, following Gouveia and Strauss
(1994). They obtain that the aggregate marginal tax rate is 1.8 times bigger than the aggregate
average tax rate. However, inspection of ￿gures from estimated average tax rates reveals this
proportion to be very large.
11average e⁄ective tax rates imply the use of conservative values (smaller implied
behavioral responses).
Table 1: E⁄ective average tax rates 2001 (Source: BoscÆ et al.
(2005))
￿c ￿l ￿k
Austria 0.141 0.474 0.245
Belgium 0.123 0.452 0.288
Denmark 0.201 0.439 0.388
Finland 0.178 0.473 0.288
France 0.132 0.433 0.350
Germany 0.124 0.381 0.181
Greece 0.148 0.410 0.164
Ireland 0.173 0.316 0.136
Italy 0.107 0.417 0.262
Netherlands 0.148 0.363 0.232
Portugal 0.150 0.303 0.245
Spain 0.113 0.341 0.219
Sweden 0.133 0.555 0.361
UK 0.123 0.254 0.343
Average 0.142 0.400 0.264
Std. Dev. 0.026 0.079 0.076
Table 1 shows the existence of important di⁄erences across countries in the
EU. In the case of the consumption tax, the maximum value corresponds to Den-
mark (0.201) whereas the lower value corresponds to Italy (0.107). Therefore,
in spite of VAT harmonization teatries in the EU, which leads to a consump-
tion tax convergence, there exist important di⁄erences among EU countries.
However, standard deviation of consumption tax is signi￿cantly lower than the
standard deviation of both labor and capital taxes. The labor tax rate ranges
from a minimum of 0.254 for UK to a maximum of 0.555 of Sweden. Finally,
capital tax rates ranges from the very low rate of Ireland (0.136) to the 0.388
of Denmark, with a variability similar to the one of the labor tax.
3.2 Preference parameters
Second, preference parameters are calibrated using data observations for the
years 2000-2001, taken from the OECD National Account Database. From the

















t )W(NtH ￿ Lt) + Ct
(14)
The value of ￿ goes from 0.937 of Ireland to 0.981 of Denmark. Most of the
countries have values in the interval 0.96-0.97. The parameter ￿ ranges from
0.376 of Denmark and the Netherlands to 0.525 of Greece.
3.3 Technological parameters
Finally, we use data from national income and product account for the 14 coun-
tries to calibrate technological parameters. Data are taken from the National
Accounts OECD database. First, in order to determine the value of the total
number of disposable e⁄ective time endowment of individuals, NtH, that is,
non-sleeping hours of the working-age population, we assume that each adult
has a time endowment of 96 hours a week (H = 96). Population aged from 15
to 64 years and average hours worked by year are obtained from the Corporate
Data Environment OECD Database.
Next, we compute the values for all the technological parameters in the
model. Aggregate labor income share, (1 ￿ ￿) is computed, following Conesa
and Kehoe (2003) as unambiguous labor income divided the sum of unambiguous
labor income and unambiguous capital income:
1 ￿ ￿ =
CE
GDP ￿ NWI ￿ TS
where CE is the compensation of employees, GDP is the Gross Domestic Prod-
uct, NWI is non-wage income of the households, de￿ned as the net operating
surplus plus the net mixed income of the household sector of the economy, and
TS is taxes less subsidies. The results obtained are consistent with the ones
reported in European Commission (1995). Aggregate capital income shares ￿
goes from 0.281 for Portugal to 0.387 of Finland. For most of the countries
values are in the interval 0.30-0.34.
The depreciation rate, ￿, was chosen to match the depreciation-output ra-
tio obtained in the data. The capital stock was generated using a perpetual
inventory method under the assumption of a geometric depreciation rate:
Kt = (1 ￿ ￿)Kt￿1 + It
Capital series were generated for the period 1970-2001. The initial capital
stock was chosen iteratively to match the average capital-output ratio over the
13period 1970-1979. In constructing the public capital stock we assume that the
depreciation rate is equal to the depreciation rate of the private capital stock.
Total public capital stock have been derived using series for government con-
sumption of ￿xed capital, given the computed depreciation rate. Values for the
depreciation rate go from 0.040 of Austria to 0.064 of Denmark.
The weight of public capital relative to private factors have been calculated
from the National Accounts OECD database. The parameter ￿ is calibrated
to match the ratio of public capital to GDP. Values range from the 0.027 of
Austria to the 0.12 of Ireland.8
Finally, the parameter ￿ is set equal to zero, that is, we assume that the
elasticity of substitution between public and private inputs is unity, i.e., ￿ = 0.
Note that this assumption implies that the production function given by (3) is







Table 2 summarizes the calibrated parameters values for the EU countries
used in the computations.
Table 2: Calibrated parameters values
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Austria 0.334 0.973 0.472 0.040 0.027
Belgium 0.321 0.970 0.471 0.048 0.033
Denmark 0.308 0.981 0.376 0.064 0.031
Finland 0.387 0.957 0.485 0.053 0.070
France 0.335 0.965 0.408 0.051 0.086
Germany 0.313 0.967 0.405 0.053 0.034
Greece 0.291 0.941 0.525 0.043 0.041
Ireland 0.353 0.937 0.380 0.063 0.120
Italy 0.328 0.965 0.500 0.043 0.059
Netherlands 0.337 0.960 0.376 0.057 0.074
Portugal 0.281 0.987 0.406 0.049 0.064
Spain 0.340 0.952 0.458 0.050 0.078
Sweden 0.292 0.975 0.472 0.057 0.059
UK 0.295 0.963 0.443 0.047 0.030
4 The maximum of the La⁄er curve
The model computed in the above section can be used to answer several ques-
tions about the ￿scal policy in the EU countries. The ￿rst natural question in
8Guo and Lansing (1997) use a value of 0.0525 for the U.S. economy.
14our context is related to the relationship between ￿scal policy in each country
and the La⁄er curve. How far are the current tax levels for each country from
the maximum tax revenue level? Is there any country to the right of the maxi-
mum of the La⁄er curve? To answer these questions we ￿rst calibrate the model
to identify the current situation for each country. This exercise allow us to com-
pute the maximum ￿scal revenue level and the maximum productive e¢ ciency
level, given the current tax code. Consumption tax rate are ￿xed and therefore,
we focus on the role of capital and labor taxes. Thus, we build a bi-dimensional
La⁄er curve in terms of labor and capital tax rates, as the locus of capital and
labor tax rates that yield the same ￿scal revenues. This bi-dimensional La⁄er
curve shows the level of ￿scal revenues for each combination of capital and la-
bor taxes. From this calculations we can obtain a map of iso-revenue curves,
indicating all the combinations of capital and labor tax rates which generates a
given ￿scal revenue.
Figure 1(a-m) shows the iso-revenue curves for all countries. In thedr gigures,
we plot the iso-revenue curve for the current (referred to 2001) level of ￿scal
revenues for each country, indicating the current tax code in terms of labor and
capital income taxes and, the combinations of tax pairs that produce the same
level of ￿scal revenues. We also show the iso-revenue curves corresponding to
the 90%, 80% and 70% of the current ￿scal revenues and the maximum level
￿scal revenues tax combination. Several interesting results emerge from these
￿gures. First, the maximum ￿scal revenue level corresponds with relatively low
tax rates values. This means that, given the current tax level, there is not so
much space to increase capital and labor tax rates if countries want to increase
￿scal revenues. Second, tax levels that maximize ￿scal revenues are fairly similar
across countries indicating that the maximum of the La⁄er curve is not very
di⁄erent from one country to another. Labor tax rates at the maximum are
very similar, around 49% for all the countries. A little more variability is found
in the case of the capital tax rates, with a average value around 37%.
One important fact we obtain is that for all the countries, the iso-revenue
curves takes the form of an ellipse but very vertical, representing capital tax
in the vertical axis and the labor tax in the horizontal axis. This implies that
￿scal revenues are very sensitive to changes in the labor tax but not to changes
in the capital tax. Several reasons can explain this result. First, labor income
is more important than capital income because it represents a larger share of
national income. Thus, ￿scal revenues are more sensitive to changes in the
labor tax than to changes in the capital tax. Second, this result implies that
15distortionary e⁄ects of capital taxes are larger than the corresponding to labor
taxes. For instance, an increase in the capital tax rate provokes a very small
change in ￿scal revenues, due to the fact that such an increase a⁄ects negatively,
in an important proportion, the capital accumulation.
In Table 3, columns 2 and 3 show tax rates that maximize ￿scal revenues and
in bracket we show the di⁄erence with respect to the current tax rates, while
columns 4 and 5 compute tax rates corresponding to the maximum productive
e¢ ciency. The last column at the right shows the percentage deviations in terms
of ￿scal revenues of the current situation for each country with respect to the
maximum ￿scal revenues.
Table 3: Maximal revenue vs e¢ cient tax codes
Maximal tax revenues Maximal e¢ ciency %
￿l ￿k ￿l ￿k
Austria 0.48 (0.00) 0.33 (0.08) 0.00 0.00 0.20
Belgium 0.50 (0.05) 0.34 (0.05) 0.00 0.00 0.70
Denmark 0.45 (0.01) 0.36 (-0.03) 0.00 0.00 0.03
Finland 0.46 (-0.01) 0.34 (0.05) 0.00 0.00 0.04
France 0.49 (0.06) 0.40 (0.05) 0.05 0.00 1.22
Germany 0.48 (0.10) 0.36 (0.18) 0.00 0.00 4.31
Greece 0.49 (0.05) 0.31 (0.16) 0.00 0.00 2.94
Ireland 0.47 (0.15) 0.40 (0.26) 0.08 0.00 11.17
Italy 0.51 (0.09) 0.37 (0.11) 0.04 0.00 3.33
Netherlands 0.47 (0.11) 0.39 (0.16) 0.01 0.00 5.05
Portugal 0.51 (0.15) 0.45 (0.20) 0.01 0.00 13.64
Spain 0.50 (0.16) 0.40 (0.18) 0.06 0.00 9.55
Sweden 0.51 (-0.04) 0.40 (0.04) 0.01 0.00 0.39
UK 0.50 (0.25) 0.37 (0.03) 0.00 0.00 13.60
Average 0.487 0.373 0.021 0.00 -
Std. Dev. 0.019 0.036 0.028 0.00 -
We observe several countries where the current tax code (referred to the year
2001) is very close to the maximal ￿scal revenue tax code. Moreover, some of
them, are to the right of the maximum of the bi-dimensional La⁄er curve. In
fact, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France and Sweden are countries in
which the current tax code is very close the maximum tax revenue level. On
the opposite side, the countries that are farther from the La⁄er maximum are
Portugal, UK, Ireland, and Spain.
We observe three countries where some taxes are above the maximum ￿s-
cal revenue tax level; termed ￿ the prohibitive range￿by La⁄er (1981). These
countries are Denmark, Finland and Sweden9. In the case of Denmark we ob-
9Jonsson and Klein (2003) calibrating three di⁄erent GE models, also obtained that Sweden
16serve that the capital tax is slightly above the maximum revenue capital tax.
In fact, Denmark is the country of the EU-15 with the larger capital tax rate.
Simply, by reducing the capital tax rate, ￿scal revenues in Denmark would in-
crease. The other two special cases are Finland and Sweden, where the labor
tax rate is above the maximum ￿scal revenues labor tax, particularly in Sweden.
Therefore, in these two countries by reducing the labor tax rate would obtain
an increase in both, the ￿scal revenue and e¢ ciency.
Finally, we also compute the maximum e¢ ciency tax code for each country,
that is, the tax code corresponding to the maximum output level, given the
consumption tax rate. Without the existence of public capital in the produc-
tion function, the maximum e¢ ciency tax code would be trivially zero, as it is
obtained in FernÆndez de C￿rdoba and Torregrosa (2005). Not surprisingly, the
maximum productive e¢ ciency shows zero capital tax rates for all countries.
However, we ￿nd several examples with positive labor taxes, such as France,
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. This ￿nding shows
that for these countries, ￿scal revenues obtained from consumption taxes are
not enough to support the observed level of public input provision. The largest
values for the optimal labor tax rates correspond to Ireland (8%) and Spain
(6%), followed by France (5%) and Italy (4%). For Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
Germany, Greece and UK, ￿scal revenues obtained from consumption tax are
enough to support the observed level of public input provision.
This set of results show that the macroeconomic implications of the tax sys-
tem in the European countries are very similar, both in terms of ￿scal revenues
and e¢ ciency. First, we obtain that capital and labor tax rates corresponding
to the maximum of the La⁄er bi-dimensional curve are similar across countries.
Therefore, a natural way to achieve ￿scal harmonization in Europe would be the
case if all the countries decide to move to the maximal tax revenues level. If the
objective of all countries were to maximize tax revenues, then ￿scal harmoniza-
tion would be almost perfect, with respect to both labor and capital tax rates.
Second, a similar behavior is obtained in reference to the maximal e¢ ciency
level. In this case total harmonization of the capital tax rates is obtained if all
countries decide to use a maximal e¢ ciency tax code.
is well to the right of the maximum of the La⁄er curve for most of the tax instruments. A
similar result was found by Hansson (1984) using a static model.
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To maximize productive e¢ ciency given a level of ￿scal revenues implies to ￿nd
an ordered pair (￿k;￿l) such that the rate of substitution between capital and
labor tax that keeps production constant is equalized to the rate of substitution
that keeps ￿scal revenues constant. Next, we consider the optimal tax level for
each country, ￿xing ￿scal revenues at the currently (2001) observed level. The
question we want to answer is, if it is possible to increase productive e¢ ciency
in the di⁄erent European countries by substituting one tax by the other without
changing public revenues. Results obtained in the previous section help us to
answer this question. For most countries this implies a substitution of capi-
tal by labor taxes, that is, government budget balance is maintained through
adjustment in the tax rate on labor income.
Table 4 shows the optimal tax code for each country together with the per-
centage change in output, capital and labor that should be veri￿ed in order
to attain the optimal tax schedule. Additionally, Figure 2(a-m) combines the
iso-revenue curves together with the iso-output curves, representing combina-
tions of capital and labor tax rates that produce the same level of output. We
plot the iso-revenue curve corresponding to the current level of ￿scal revenues
together with the iso-output curves, normalized to 100 at the point of the cur-
rent tax code. For each level of ￿scal revenues, there exists only one pair of
tax rates that maximizes output, determined by the tangency point closest to
the origin between the iso-revenue and the iso-output lines. As we can observe,
the iso-output curves are concave and as we showed in the previous section, the
maximum e¢ ciency level corresponds to a non-zero tax rates for some coun-
tries10.
For most countries, optimal tax rates imply a reduction in capital tax rates
and an increases in labor tax rates, thus, increasing capital stock and reducing
labor. This e⁄ect is found in all the countries except Finland and Sweden, that
is, the two countries in which the labor tax rate is above the maximum revenue
labor tax.
Table 4: Optimal tax code
10La⁄er (1981), assumes that the iso-output curves between capital and labor taxes are con-
vex, re￿ecting the implicit assumption of a diminishing marginal rate of substitution between
factor tax rates. However, calibration of our model suggests the existence of a increasing
marginal rate of substitution between factor tax rates.
18Change in Change in Change in
￿l ￿k GDP (%) K (%) L (%)
Austria 0.47 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00
Belgium 0.47 0.20 0.66 6.27 -1.85
Denmark 0.45 0.31 1.07 5.07 -0.61
Finland 0.46 0.30 0.68 -0.09 1.26
France 0.46 0.26 0.61 5.69 -3.20
Germany 0.42 0.00 0.85 8.72 -3.57
Greece 0.43 0.09 0.11 6.40 -1.87
Ireland 0.35 0.00 0.64 8.62 -3.36
Italy 0.46 0.10 1.52 10.68 -2.52
Netherlands 0.40 0.07 0.86 10.12 -3.44
Portugal 0.32 0.00 1.92 9.02 -0.74
Spain 0.40 0.00 1.68 17.07 -3.81
Sweden 0.49 0.28 11.19 16.50 10.22
UK 0.31 0.00 4.32 28.46 -4.26
Average 0.420 0.133 - - -
Std. Dev. 0.058 0.127 - - -
The tax code is optimal for Austria, i.e., given the current level of ￿scal
revenues, and given the consumption tax rate in Austria, the combination of
capital and labor tax rates in this country corresponds to the maximum output
level. Greece is another country where the current tax code is very close to the
optimal. In fact, changing the current tax rates would increase output by only
0.11%. However, the reduction in the capital tax rate and the increase in the
labor tax rate would generate an increase of 6.4% in the stock of capital and a
reduction of 1.87% in labor. On the other hand, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, and Netherlands are countries where
the optimal tax code does not cause a signi￿cant change in GDP but implies im-
portant variations in the utilization of capital and labor. For Germany, Ireland,
The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the UK, capital tax goes to zero. Razin
and Yuen (1999) show that under both, tax competition and tax coordination,
the optimal long run tax rate on capital incomes will be zero, resulting in the
so-called ￿ race to the bottom￿in capital income taxation.
The most ine¢ cient case is that of Sweden, located at the right of the maxi-
mum of the La⁄er curve. By reducing both, capital and labor taxes, productive
e¢ ciency increases whereas tax revenues remain constant. In fact, changing the
combination of taxes, output would increases a 11.2%. Moreover, the utilization
of capital and labor factors would increase.
Results obtained from the above exercise give us some ideas about the ques-
19tion if optimal tax code for each country, given the current level of ￿scal rev-
enues, favors or not ￿scal harmonization. The answer is positive in the case of
labor tax rates whereas is negative in the case of capital tax rates. Optimal
labor tax rates display a standard deviation of 0.058, whereas in the current
situation standard deviation is 0.079. Therefore, variability of labor tax rates
across countries would be reduced if these countries change the current level
of labor tax rates to the optimal ones. However, we observe how capital tax
rates variability increases in the optimal tax code. The reason is that for some
countries, the optimal capital tax rate is zero, whereas for other countries the
optimal rate is di⁄erent from zero. These results imply that optimal capital
tax rates are very sensitive to small di⁄erences in preference and technological
parameters across European countries whereas a much more homogeneous e⁄ect
is found with respect to the labor tax rates.
6 Capital tax harmonization
Finally, we conduct a simulation on the e⁄ects on ￿scal revenues and output
of capital tax harmonization in the EU countries. We consider two capital
harmonization possibilities: First, harmonization is assumed to take place at
the unweighted average capital tax rate, similar to the analysis in Słrensen
(2004), and second, harmonization is assumed to take place at the minimum
capital tax rate, corresponding to Ireland. The average capital tax rate is 0.264,
whereas the Ireland capital tax is 0.14.
Table 5 shows the results of the simulation. First, considering the case of
capital tax harmonization based on the average capital tax, we observe that the
￿scal revenues do not change signi￿cantly for most of the countries, except for
the case of Ireland. This result is provoked by the fact that Ireland has a very
low capital tax rate compared to other countries. On the other hand, Belgium,
Denmark, Finland, France and the UK are countries where ￿scal revenues are
reduced, whereas ￿scal revenues increase in any other country. The most favored
country is Sweden, where ￿scal revenues remain almost constant, whereas output
increases a 2.8%. In terms of output, this harmonization process would a⁄ect
negatively to Germany, Greece and Ireland, and in a lesser extend to Spain and
the Netherlands. On the other hand, output would increases by around 3% in
Denmark, France, Sweden and the UK. In general, we obtain that the response
of ￿scal revenues tyo changes in capital taxes is much more smaller than the
response of output.
20Next, we consider the case where capital tax harmonization takes place at
the minimum capital tax rate, corresponding to Ireland (0.14). This implies a
reduction in capital tax rates in all EU-15 countries and no e⁄ect on Ireland.
In this case, all countries experience a loss of ￿scal revenues (except, of course,
Ireland), given the signi￿cant reduction in the capital tax rate. The most impor-
tant reductions in ￿scal revenues correspond to the UK (around -5%), France
(-2.5%) and Spain (-2.2%). However, gains in e¢ ciency are very important,
and output increases signi￿cantly in all countries. UK is the country were ￿scal
revenues would decrease in a larger proportion, close to -5 percent but output
would increases 7%. In the case of Spain we observe that ￿scal revenues are very
sensitive to the change in capital tax, but changes in output are small. In fact,
the reduction in ￿scal revenues are similar in Spain and France, but whereas in
the ￿rst output increases only by 2.75%, in the case of France output increases
7.7%. The larger e⁄ects on output, other than in UK and France, correspond
to Finland, where output increases by more than 7%, whereas ￿scal revenues
decreases by 1 percent, and Denmark where, with a very short reduction in
￿scal revenues (-0.43%), output increases in 6.5%.
Table 5: Capital tax harmonization
Average capital tax Ireland capital tax
Revenues (%) GDP (%) Revenues (%) GDP (%)
Austria 0.03 -0.37 -0.56 4.07
Belgium -0.17 1.12 -1.05 5.15
Denmark -0.14 3.77 -0.43 6.50
Finland -0.10 1.55 -0.99 7.13
France -0.90 3.63 -2.47 7.69
Germany 0.95 -2.58 -0.51 1.18
Greece 1.04 -3.62 -0.25 0.67
Ireland 3.42 -3.90 0.00 0.00
Italy 0.00 0.00 -1.76 4.19
Netherlands 0.49 -1.07 -1.59 2.92
Portugal 0.12 -0.17 -1.32 1.65
Spain 1.01 -1.52 -2.17 2.75
Sweden 0.01 2.84 -0.16 5.63
UK -1.90 3.05 -4.93 7.00
7 Conclusions
Fiscal harmonization for the European Union member states is a goal that en-
counters major di¢ culties for its implementation. Each country faces a particu-
21lar trade o⁄between ￿scal revenues generated by taxation and the e¢ ciency loss
induced by the tax code. Countries for which a particular harmonized tax code
requires more taxation, will have to face an increased e¢ ciency loss, and those
required to decrease their taxes, will have to face a loss in ￿scal revenue. This
￿scal harmonization process is particularly important with respect to capital
taxes, given the perfect capital mobility across European countries.
This papers provides a quantitative measure of these trade-o⁄s for a number
of taxes and for all those countries of the European Union using a DGE model
with public input provision. We calibrate the model and use it to answer a set
of important questions regarding ￿scal policy and ￿scal harmonization in the
EU-15 context. Calibration of the model for the EU-15, except Luxembourg,
yields the following results:
i) First, we calculate bi-dimensional La⁄er curves for each country, to com-
pute the maximal revenue tax code for each country. The maximum tax revenue
level is not far from the current taxes level for most countries.
ii) The case of Sweden, Denmark and Finland are anomalous, as e¢ ciency
can be gained by lowering tax rates without changing ￿scal revenues. This is
due to the fact that these three countries are to the right of the maximum of
the La⁄er curve for some tax.
iii) In general, countries would obtain e¢ ciency gains without changing ￿scal
revenues by reducing capital taxes and increasing labor taxes. We obtain a group
of countries for which the maximal e¢ ciency capital tax rate is zero.
iv) Finally, we conduct a simulation exercise showing that capital tax har-
monization to the average capital tax rate can be done with quite small changes
in both ￿scal revenues and output for the majority of countries. However, when
capital harmonization is supposed to be at the minimum current capital tax,
changes in ￿scal revenues and output would be signi￿cant.
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Figure 2.n: Optimal tax code (UK).
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